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Abstract
Separate selling of two independent goods is shown to yield at least
62% of the optimal revenue, and at least 73% when the goods satisfy
the Myerson regularity condition. This improves the 50% result of
Hart and Nisan (2017, originally circulated in 2012).
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1 Introduction
One of the most celebrated aspects of Myerson’s (1981) optimal auction result
is that it provides an economic explanation for the ubiquitous use of the four
standard auction forms. Strictly speaking, however, Myerson’s results apply
only to cases in which a seller is selling a single good. Because many sellers
sell multiple goods, extending Myerson’s analysis to the multi-good case has
long been considered a critical next step. But the multi-good monopoly
problem has resisted a complete solution for over 35 years and by now it
is well understood to be an extremely difficult problem. Worse still, it is
known that the optimal solution must typically be quite complex and very
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often requires buyers to purchase randomized contracts. And therein lies the
difficulty, because we do not often, if ever, observe complex or randomized
selling mechanisms in practice. This raises the obvious question, Why not?
One reason that we may not observe the kinds of complex mechanisms
that full optimality dictates is that relatively simple mechanisms may suffice
for generating much of the revenue that could ever be generated. Thus, a
complementary approach to the research program initiated in Myerson (1981)
is to search for relatively simple mechanisms that yield a significant fraction
of the revenue that is generated by a fully optimal mechanism.1 The present
paper represents a modest contribution to this program.
We consider a single seller who has one unit each of two indivisible goods.
The two goods need not be identical. The seller, whose value for the two
goods is zero, can offer to sell the goods to a single buyer. The buyer’s two
values, one value for each of the two goods, are unknown to the seller but
are known to be independently distributed (so we say that the two goods
are independent). The buyer is risk neutral and has preferences that are
additive in the values and (negatively so) in the price paid. Even in this
most basic case, there is no known characterization of the optimal selling
mechanism, though it is known that the optimal mechanism can display
unusual properties.2 We ask, What fraction of the optimal revenue can the
seller guarantee by selling each of the two goods separately, i.e., by posting
a Myerson-optimal price for each of the goods?
In the context of a general analysis with any finite number of indepen-
dent goods, Hart and Nisan (2017, originally circulated in 2012) show in
particular that, by selling two independent goods separately, the seller can
guarantee at least 50% of the optimal revenue but cannot guarantee more
1For examples of this approach, see Hart and Nisan (2017) and the references therein.
2For example, the optimal mechanism can be non-monotonic (i.e., increasing the buyer’s
valuations may well decrease the seller’s optimal revenue), and it can require the buyer
to accept randomized contracts. See Hart and Reny (2015); Section 3 there contains
references to previous examples that require such randomizations.
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than3 78%. A nice feature of the 50% revenue guarantee is that its proof
is relatively simple. In part, this simplicity arises from the rather generous
bounds that are established at various steps. While it seems clear that the
bounds employed in the Hart–Nisan proof are “much” too generous, tight-
ening them as we do here requires a surprising amount of additional effort.
Hart and Nisan also show that if, in addition, the buyer’s two independent
values are identically distributed, then the revenue guarantee is at least 73%,
which is tantalizingly close to the 78% upper limit.
Our main result significantly improves upon the Hart–Nisan 50% guaran-
tee, and shows that their 73% guarantee with identically distributed values
can also be obtained when the buyer’s value distributions satisfy Myerson-
regularity. None of our results require the two values to be identically dis-
tributed.
Main Result. For any two independent goods, selling each good
separately at its optimal one-good price guarantees at least√
e/(
√
e + 1) ≈ 62% of the optimal revenue. Furthermore, if the
buyer’s two value distributions each satisfy Myerson-regularity,
then the guaranteed fraction of optimal revenue increases to
e/(e+ 1) ≈ 73%.
This is stated below as Theorems 7 and 9.
To summarize the known bounds on the guaranteed fraction of optimal
revenue (gfor) from selling separately two goods: when the goods are in-
dependent, the gfor is at least 62%; when they are independent and either
Myerson-regular or identically distributed, the gfor is at least 73%; in all
these three cases, the gfor is at most 78%; and, when the goods are not
necessarily independent, the gfor drops all the way down to zero (Hart and
Nisan 2013).4
3Hart and Nisan (2017) establish the 78% upper bound with an explicit example in
which it is optimal to sell two independent and identically distributed goods as a bundle
(these goods satisfy the Myerson-regularity condition).
4For more than two goods a similar result is due to Briest, Chawla, Kleinberg, and
4
1.1 Some Related Work
There is by now a vast literature in game theory, economics, and computer
science that deals with the (optimal) selling of multiple goods. While that
literature is too large to survey here, the reader may wish to consult the
literature section in, say, Hart and Nisan (2017) for an overview. We will
mention here the work of Babaioff, Immorlica, Lucier, and Weinberg (2014)
that shows that the better option between selling the goods separately and
selling them as the bundle of all goods yields a gfor that is bounded away
from zero for any number of goods. Recently, in the case of two independent
goods, Babaioff, Nisan, and Rubinstein (2018) have shown that separate
selling yields at least 78% of the optimal deterministic revenue, and that this
bound is tight. In the related setup of a unit-demand buyer (who desires
to buy only one good, rather than having an additive value over bundles of
goods), Chawla, Malec, and Sivan (2010, Theorem 5) show a gfor of 1/4 for
the separate selling of any number of independent goods. Finally, Daskalakis,
Deckelbaum, and Tzamos (2017) provide a useful duality characterization of
the revenue-optimizing mechanism for multiple goods.
1.2 Organization of the Paper
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, defines the
appropriate concepts, and provides some preliminary results. Section 3 gives
an outline of the proof. The proof itself consists of a general decomposition
result (Proposition 4 in Section 4) and an estimate of the crucial term there
(Proposition 6 in Section 5), which, when combined, give the first part of
the Main Theorem, namely, the general 62% bound (Theorem 7 in Section
6). Section 7 proves the second part of the Main Theorem, namely, the 73%
bound for regular distributions (Theorem 9), together with some additional
results. Appendix A provides a general result on the continuity of the revenue
Weinberg (2015, originally circulated in 2010).
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with respect to valuations (which is of independent interest), and Appendix
B gives a simple illustration of the use of nonsymmetric diagonals.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The Model
The basic model is standard, and the notation follows Hart and Reny (2015)
and Hart and Nisan (2017), which the reader may consult for further details
and references.
One seller (or “monopolist”) is selling a number k ≥ 1 of goods (or
“items,” “objects,” etc.) to one buyer.
The goods have no value or cost to the seller. Let x1, x2, ..., xk ≥ 0 be
the buyer’s values for the goods. The value for getting a set of goods is
additive: getting the subset I ⊆ {1, 2, ..., k} of goods is worth ∑i∈I xi to
the buyer (and so, in particular, the buyer’s demand is not restricted to
one good only). The valuation of the goods is given by a random variable
X = (X1, X2, ..., Xk) that takes values in R
k
+ (we thus assume that valuations
are always nonnegative); we will refer to X as a k-good random valuation.
The realization x = (x1, x2, ..., xk) ∈ Rk+ of X is known to the buyer, but not
to the seller, who knows only the distribution F of X (which may be viewed
as the seller’s belief); we refer to a buyer with valuation x also as a buyer of
type x. The buyer and the seller are assumed to be risk neutral and to have
quasi-linear utilities.
The objective is to maximize the seller’s (expected) revenue.
By the Revelation Principle (Myerson 1981), it is without loss of gener-
ality to restrict attention to “direct mechanisms” that are “incentive com-
patible.” A direct mechanism µ consists of a pair of functions5 (q, s), where
5All functions in this paper are assumed to be Borel measurable (cf. Hart and Reny
2015, footnotes 10 and 48).
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q = (q1, q2, ..., qk) : R
k
+ → [0, 1]k and6 s : Rk+ → R. If the buyer reports a
valuation vector x ∈ Rk+, then qi(x) ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that the buyer
receives good7 i (for i = 1, 2, ..., k), and s(x) is the payment that the seller
receives from the buyer. When the buyer reports his value x truthfully, his
payoff is8 b(x) =
∑k
i=1 qi(x)xi− s(x) = q(x) · x− s(x), and the seller’s payoff
is s(x).
The mechanism µ = (q, s) satisfies individual rationality (IR) if b(x) ≥ 0
for every9 x ∈ Rk+; it satisfies incentive compatibility (IC) if b(x) ≥ q(x˜) ·x−
s(x˜) for every alternative report x˜ ∈ Rk+ of the buyer when his value is x,
for every x ∈ Rk+; and it satisfies no positive transfer (NPT) if s(x) ≥ 0 for
every x ∈ Rk+ (which, together with IR, implies that s(0) = b(0) = 0).
The (expected) revenue of a mechanism µ = (q, s) from a buyer with
random valuation X, which we denote by R(µ;X), is the expectation of the
payment received by the seller; i.e., R(µ;X) = E [s(X)] . We now define:
• Rev(X), the optimal revenue, is the maximal revenue that can be
obtained: Rev(X) := supµR(µ;X), where the supremum is taken over
all mechanisms µ that satisfy IR and IC.
When there is only one good, i.e., when k = 1, Myerson’s (1981) result is
that
Rev(X) = sup
p≥0
p · P [X ≥ p] = sup
p≥0
p · P [X > p] = sup
p≥0
p · (1− F (p)), (1)
where F is the cumulative distribution function of X. Optimal mechanisms
correspond to the seller “posting” a price p and the buyer buying the good
6Without loss of generality any mechanism can always be extended to the whole space
R
k
+; see Hart and Reny (2015).
7When the goods are infinitely divisible and the valuations are linear in quantities, qi
may be alternatively viewed as the quantity of good i that the buyer gets.
8The scalar product of two n-dimensional vectors y = (y1, ..., yn) and z = (z1, ..., zn) is
y · z =∑ni=1 yizi.
9Individual rationality recognizes that, regardless of his valuation, the buyer can obtain
an expected payoff of zero by not participating in the mechanism.
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for the price p whenever his value is at least p; in other words, the seller
makes the buyer a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer to buy the good at price p.
Besides the maximal revenue Rev(X), we consider what can be obtained
from the simple class of mechanisms that sell each good separately.
• SRev(X), the separate revenue, is the maximal revenue that can be
obtained by selling each good separately. Thus
SRev(X) = Rev(X1) +Rev(X2) + ...+Rev(Xk).
The separate revenue is obtained by solving k one-dimensional problems
(using (1)), one for each good.
We now state the basic properties from Hart and Nisan (2017, Proposi-
tions 5 and 6) needed for our proof.
Proposition 1 (i) Let µ = (q, s) be a mechanism for k goods with buyer
payoff function b. Then µ = (q, s) satisfies IC if and only if b is a
convex function and for all x the vector q(x) is a subgradient of b at x
(i.e., b(x˜)− b(x) ≥ q(x) · (x˜− x) for all x˜).
(ii) Rev(X) = supµR(µ;X) with the supremum taken over all IC, IR, and
NPT mechanisms µ.
2.2 Distributions
As we show formally in Appendix A.1, for the results of the present paper
we can limit ourselves without loss of generality to valuations that admit
a density function (this follows from general continuity properties of the
revenue, which we prove in Appendix A, and are of independent interest).
In what follows we thus assume that every nonnegative random variable
X has an absolutely continuous cumulative distribution function, F (t) =
8
P [X ≤ t] = P [X < t] , with an associated density function f(t). We denote
by G the tail probability, i.e.,
G(t) := 1− F (t) =
∫ ∞
t
f(u)du = P [X ≥ t] ,
and by H the cumulative tail probability, i.e.,
H(t) :=
∫ t
0
G(u)du = E [min{X, t}] (2)
(the equality holds since E [min{X, t}] = ∫∞
0
P [min{X, t} ≥ u] du =∫ t
0
P [X ≥ u] du = ∫ t
0
G(u)du).
Let r :=Rev(X) > 0 be10 the optimal revenue from X ; then (1) implies
G(t) ≤ r/t, which together with G(t) ≤ 1 gives
G(t) ≤ min
{r
t
, 1
}
.
Therefore
H(t) ≤
∫ r
0
1du+
∫ t
r
r
u
du = r + r log
t
r
, (3)
for every t ≥ r (and H(t) ≤ t for t ≤ r).
2.3 Change of Units
We start with a trivial, but useful, change of units. For every 0 < λ1, ..., λk ≤
1, let Mλ1,...,λk denote the set of all IC and IR mechanisms µ = (q, s) that
satisfy qi(x) ∈ [0, λi] (instead of qi(x) ∈ [0, 1]) for every x ∈ Rk+ and i =
1, ..., k. The set of all IC and IR mechanisms, which we denote byM, is thus
the same as M1,...,1.
10The continuity of F implies that X cannot be identically zero, and so the optimal
revenue Rev(X) must be positive (just sell the good at a small enough positive price).
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Lemma 2 For every 0 < λ1, ..., λk ≤ 1 we have
Rev(X1, ..., Xk) = sup
µ∈Mλ1,...,λk
R(µ; X˜1, ..., X˜k),
where X˜i := (1/λi)Xi for i = 1, ..., k.
Proof. Given µ = (q, s) with qi(x) ∈ [0, λi] for all i, define µˆ = (qˆ, sˆ)
by qˆi(x1, ..., xk) := (1/λi)qi(x1/λ1, ..., xk/λk) ∈ [0, 1] and sˆ(x1, ..., xk) :=
s(x1/λ1, ..., xk/λk) (and thus bˆ(x1, ..., xk) = b(x1/λ1, ..., xk/λk) for the corre-
sponding buyer’s payoff functions). It is immediate to see that µˆ is IC and IR
if and only if µ is IC and IR, and that E
[
s(X˜1, ..., X˜k)
]
= E [sˆ(X1, ..., Xk)] .
Conversely, given µˆ one generates µ by the reverse transformation.
3 Overview of the Proof
The first part of the proof is similar to the proofs of Theorems A and B in
Hart and Nisan (2017)11 except that, where they split the buyer’s space of
values (x1, x2) ∈ R2+ in half along the diagonal x1 = x2, we split the space
into two regions x1 ≥ λx2 and x1 < λx2 along a possibly nonsymmetric
diagonal x1 = λx2 (the precise value of λ will be chosen later). For any two-
good mechanism, the revenue in each of the two regions can be estimated
by constructing from it appropriate one-good mechanisms, which eventually
leads to a key bound: see Proposition 4 in Section 4. (Rather than working
directly with the two asymmetric regions, which is cumbersome, the proof
simplifies computations by first making an appropriate change of units, which
amounts to rescaling the probabilities that the goods are received: see Lemma
2 in Section 2.3.) Once we have the bound given in Proposition 4, we need
to estimate the maximum of a certain integral expression—which is essen-
tially the additional revenue that is achievable beyond the separate one-good
11The reader is encouraged to look at these proofs and the explanations there.
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revenues—over pairs of nonnegative functions ϕ1, ϕ2 whose sum ϕ1 + ϕ2 is
nondecreasing. This is accomplished in Proposition 5, by considering the ap-
propriate extreme functions and then carefully estimating the relevant terms
(this is the hardest part of the proof). In Section 6 we put everything to-
gether, and, by choosing the best possible λ (specifically, λ = 1/
√
e), prove
the 62% bound (Theorem 7). Then in Section 7 we show the 73% bound for
Myerson-regular goods (Theorem 9), and then we also deal with monotonic
mechanisms. There are two appendices: Appendix A establishes that, under
quite permissive conditions, the seller’s revenue is continuous in the distri-
bution of the buyer’s valuation, a result that we use in our proof, but that
is also of independent interest, and Appendix B provides a simple illustra-
tion of how the “nonsymmetric diagonal” construct alone can produce useful
bounds.
4 Bounding the Revenue by Nonsymmetric
Decomposition
This section provides the basic decomposition with respect to a nonsymmet-
ric diagonal (equivalently, we make a corresponding change of units and use
the symmetric diagonal; see Section 2.3).
Given a two-good random valuation (X1, X2), for i = 1, 2 let Fi denote
the cumulative distribution function of Xi, and let fi, Gi, and Hi be the asso-
ciated funtions as defined in Section 2.2 (namely, the density, tail probability,
and cumulative tail probability functions, respectively). We let ri :=Rev(Xi)
be the optimal revenue that can be obtained from good i, and define two use-
ful auxiliary functions K1 and K2:
K1(t) := f2(t)(H1(t)− r1)−G1(t)G2(t), (4)
K2(t) := f1(t)(H2(t)− r2)−G1(t)G2(t). (5)
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The following lemma, which slightly generalizes Lemma 19 in Hart and
Nisan (2017) (it replaces the factor 1 − q(x0) there with λ − q(x0) here),
obtains a better bound on the revenue of a mechanism by “rescaling” its
allocation function q so that it covers the entire interval [0, λ].
Lemma 3 Let X be a one-good random valuation with values bounded from
below by some x0 ≥ 0. Then for every IC mechanism µ = (q, s) that satisfies
q(x) ≤ λ for all12 x ≥ x0 we have
R(µ;X) ≤ (λ− q(x0))Rev(X) + s(x0). (6)
Proof. The function q is nondecreasing (because q is the derivative of the
buyer’s payoff function b, which is convex), and so q(x0) ≤ q(x) ≤ λ for all13
x ≥ x0.
If q(x0) = λ then q(x) = q(x0) = λ for all x ≥ x0, hence s(x) = s(x0) for
all x ≥ x0 by IC; therefore E [s(X)] = s(x0) and (6) holds as equality.
If q(x0) < λ then define a new mechanism µˆ = (qˆ, sˆ) by qˆ(x) := θ(q(x)−
q(x0)) and sˆ(x) := θ(s(x)− s(x0)), and thus bˆ(x) := θ(b(x)− (x−x0)q(x0)−
b(x0)), where θ := 1/(λ− q(x0)) > 0 (so that 0 ≤ qˆ(x) ≤ 1). It is immediate
to verify that (qˆ, sˆ) is an IC and IR mechanism: indeed, [qˆ(x) · x − sˆ(x)] −
[qˆ(x′)·x−sˆ(x′)] = θ ([q(x) · x− s(x)]− [q(x′) · x− s(x′)]) ≥ 0, and bˆ(x0) = 0.
Therefore Rev(X) ≥ E [sˆ(X)] = θ(E [s(X)]− s(x0)), which yields (6).
We now come to the main result of this section, which generalizes the
decomposition of the proofs of Theorems A and B in Hart and Nisan (2017):
the revenue from two goods is bounded by the sum of the separate one-good
revenues and an additional term (the Ki-term), which will be estimated in
the next section.
12It suffices to require q(x) ≤ λ for x in the support of X. As in Hart and Reny (2015),
one can always extend a k-good mechanism to the whole space Rk+ without increasing its
menu beyond taking closure, and so the bound extends to all Rk+.
13If the values of X are bounded from above by some finite x1, then we can replace λ
with q(x1).
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Proposition 4 Let X = (X1, X2) be a two-good random valuation with in-
dependent goods (i.e., X1 and X2 are independent nonnegative real random
variables), and let µ = (q, s) be a two-good IC, IR, and NPT mechanism that
satisfies qi(x) ≤ λi for all x ∈ R2+ and i = 1, 2. Then there exist functions
ϕi : R+ → [0, λi] for i = 1, 2 such that ϕ1 + ϕ2 is a nondecreasing function
and
R(µ;X1, X2) ≤ λ1r1 + λ2r2 +
∫ ∞
0
(ϕ1(t)K1(t) + ϕ2(t)K2(t))dt; (7)
specifically, ϕi(t) = qi(t, t).
Proof. The first part of the proof, which yields (10), goes along the same
lines as the proof of Theorem B in Appendix A.1 of Hart and Nisan (2017),
but with the appropriate modifications, because here X1 and X2 are not
identically distributed, the mechanism µ is not symmetric, and each qi is
bounded by λi.
We will write Y for X1 and Z for X2, and so X = (Y, Z).
For every t ≥ 0 define14 Φ(t) := b(t, t) and ϕi(t) := qi(t, t). By Proposition
1(i) the function Φ is convex and q(t, t) = (ϕ1(t), ϕ2(t)) is a subgradient of
b at (t, t), and so ϕ1(t) + ϕ2(t) is a subgradient of Φ at t. Therefore ϕ1 + ϕ2
is a nondecreasing function, and Φ(u) =
∫ u
0
(ϕ1(t) + ϕ2(t))dt (use Corollary
24.2.1 in Rockafellar 1970, recalling that Φ(0) = b(0, 0) = 0 by NPT).
Consider first the region Y ≥ Z. For each fixed value z ≥ 0 of the second
good such that P [Y ≥ z] > 0, define a mechanism µz = (qz, sz) for the
first good by replacing the allocation of the second good with an equivalent
decrease in payment; that is, the allocation of the first good is unchanged,
i.e., qz(y) := q1(y, z), and the payment is s
z(y) := s(y, z)−zq2(y, z), for every
y ≥ 0; note that the buyer’s payoff remains the same: bz(y) = b(y, z). The
mechanism µz is IC and IR for y, since µ is IC and IR for (y, z). Let Y z
denote the random variable Y conditional on the event Y ≥ z, and consider
14Notice that Φ here is 2Φ in Hart and Nisan (2017).
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the revenue R(µz; Y z) = E [sz(Y z)] = E [sz(Y )|Y ≥ z] of µz from Y z. We
have Y z ≥ z, qz(z) = q1(z, z) = ϕ1(z), and sz(z) = s(z, z) − zq2(z, z) =
zq1(z, z) − b(z, z) = zϕ1(z)− Φ(z), and so, applying Lemma 3 above to Y z,
we have
E [sz(Y )|Y ≥ z] ≤ (λ1 − ϕ1(z))Rev(Y z) + zϕ1(z)− Φ(z). (8)
Since P [Yz ≥ t] = P [Y ≥ t] /P [Y ≥ z] = G1(t)/P [Y ≥ z] for all t ≥ z, using
(1) we get
Rev(Y z) = sup
t≥0
t·P [Y z ≥ t] = sup
t≥z
t· G1(t)
P [Y ≥ z] ≤
supt≥0 t ·G1(t)
P [Y ≥ z] =
r1
P [Y ≥ z]
(recall that r1 =Rev(Y )). Substitute this into (8), and multiply it by P [Y ≥ z] ,
to get
E [sz(Y )1Y≥z] ≤ (λ1 − ϕ1(z))r1 + (zϕ1(z)− Φ(z))P [Y ≥ z]
for all z ≥ 0 (which trivially includes those z where P [Y ≥ z] = 0). Taking
expectation over the values z of Z yields
E
[
sZ(Y )1Y≥Z
] ≤ λ1r1 − r1 E [ϕ1(Z)] + E [(Zϕ1(Z)− Φ(Z)1Y≥Z ] . (9)
For y ≥ z ≥ 0 we have s(y, z) = sz(y) + zq2(y, z) ≤ sz(y) + zq2(y, y) =
sz(y)+ zϕ2(y) (by the monotonicity of q2 in its second variable, again by the
convexity of b), which together with (9) yields
E [s(Y, Z)1Y≥Z ] ≤ E
[
sZ(Y )1Y≥Z
]
+ E [Zϕ2(Y )1Y≥Z ]
≤ λ1r1 − r1 E [ϕ1(Z)] + E [(Zϕ2(Y ) + Zϕ1(Z)− Φ(Z))1Y≥Z ]
= λ1r1 − r1 E [ϕ1(Z)] + E [(Λϕ2(Y ) + Λϕ1(Z)− Φ(Λ)) 1Y≥Z ] ,
where we put Λ := min{Y, Z}.
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Consider next the Z > Y. Interchanging Y and Z and using Z > y instead
of Z ≥ y throughout gives
E [s(Y, Z)1Z>Y ] ≤ λ2r2−r2 E [ϕ2(Y )]+E [(Λϕ1(Z) + Λϕ2(Y )− Φ(Λ)) 1Z>Y ] .
Adding the last two inequalities yields
E [s(Y, Z)] ≤ λ1r1 + λ2r2 − r1 E [ϕ1(Z)]− r2 E [ϕ2(Y )]
+E [Λϕ1(Z) + Λϕ2(Y )− Φ(Λ)]
= λ1r1 + λ2r2
+E [ϕ1(Z) (Λ− r1)] + E [ϕ2(Y ) (Λ− r2)]− E [Φ(Λ)] .(10)
Now we have
E [ϕ1(Z) (Λ− r1)] =
∫ ∞
0
ϕ1(z)(E [min{Y, z}]− r1)f2(z)dz
=
∫ ∞
0
ϕ1(z)(H1(z)− r1)f2(z)dz (11)
(use Λ = min{Y, Z} and (2)). Similarly,
E [ϕ2(Y ) (Λ− r2)] =
∫ ∞
0
ϕ2(y)(H2(y)− r2)f1(y)dy. (12)
Let FΛ be the cumulative distribution function of Λ = min{Y, Z}; then
1− FΛ(u) = GΛ(u) = G1(u)G2(u), and
E [Φ(Λ)] =
∫ ∞
0
Φ(u)dFΛ(u) = −
∫ ∞
0
Φ(u)dGΛ(u)
= [−Φ(u)GΛ(u)]∞0 +
∫ ∞
0
Φ′(u)GΛ(u)du
=
∫ ∞
0
Φ′(u)GΛ(u)du
=
∫ ∞
0
(ϕ1(u) + ϕ2(u))G1(u)G2(u)du, (13)
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where we integrated by parts to get the second line,15 and then used Φ(0) = 0
and Φ(∞)GΛ(∞) = 0 (because 0 ≤ Φ(u)GΛ(u) ≤ 2u(r1/u)(r2/u) → 0 as
u→∞, with Φ(u) ≤ 2u following from Φ′(u) ≤ 2).
Substituting (11)–(13) into (10) yields the result.
5 Bounding the Ki-Term
In this section we bound from above the term
∫
(ϕ1K1 + ϕ2K2) in (7) over
all possible functions ϕi, which take values in [0, λi], and whose sum ϕ1+ϕ2
is nondecreasing. This term is linear in the ϕi, and so, if each ϕi were
nondecreasing, it would suffice to consider only the extreme functions that
take the values 0 and λi (because any nondecreasing function is an average
of such functions; see the remark below). However, we only require the sum
to be nondecreasing, which requires a more delicate analysis; see Proposition
5. This result is then applied to our specific functions K1 and K2 to get the
bound in Proposition 6 (this constitutes the core of the proof).
From now on we will assume without loss of generality that λ1 ≤ λ2, and
so 0 < λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ 1. Let K1, K2 : R+ → R be two functions, and define
I := sup
ϕ
1
,ϕ
2
∫ ∞
0
(ϕ1(t)K1(t) + ϕ2(t)K2(t)) dt,
where the supremum is taken over all functions ϕi : R+ → [0, λi] such that
ϕ := ϕ1 + ϕ2 is a nondecreasing function.
15Formally, we integrate by parts on a finite interval [0,M ] and then let M → ∞.
The functions GΛ and Φ are absolutely continuous (because Gi = 1 − Fi for i = 1, 2 are
absolutely continuous and GΛ = G1G2, and Φ is convex and continuous).
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To estimate I, for any 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ c ≤ ∞ define
I(a, b, c) :=
∫ b
a
λ1max{K1(t), K2(t)}dt
+
∫ c
b
((λ2 − λ1)K2(t) + λ1max{K1(t), K2(t)}) dt
+
∫ ∞
c
(λ1K1(t) + λ2K2(t))dt
= λ1
∫ c
a
max{K1(t), K2(t)}dt+ λ1
∫ ∞
c
(K1(t) +K2(t))dt
+(λ2 − λ1)
∫ ∞
b
K2(t)dt. (14)
It is immediate to see that I(a, b, c) is nothing other than
∫
(ϕ1K1 + ϕ2K2)
for the following functions ϕ1 and ϕ2:
a ≤ t < b b ≤ t < c t ≥ c
ϕ1(t) λ11K1(t)≥K2(t) λ11K1(t)≥K2(t) λ1
ϕ2(t) λ11K1(t)<K2(t) λ11K1(t)<K2(t) + λ2 − λ1 λ2
Their sum ϕ1 + ϕ2 then equals
a ≤ t < b b ≤ t < c t ≥ c
ϕ1(t) + ϕ2(t) λ1 λ2 λ1 + λ2
,
which is a nondecreasing function, and so I(a, b, c) ≤ I.
Proposition 5 Let 0 < λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ 1. Then
I = sup
0≤a≤b≤c≤∞
I(a, b, c).
17
Remark. We will use the following well-known result. Every nondecreasing
function ψ : [u, v] → [0, 1] (where −∞ ≤ u ≤ v ≤ ∞) can be expressed as
an (integral) average of nondecreasing functions that take only the values
0 and16 1. More generally, every nondecreasing function ψ : [u, v] → [α, β]
(where α ≤ β are finite) can be expressed as an average of nondecreasing
functions that take only the two values α and β (when α < β, apply the
above to (ψ − α)/(β − α), which takes values in [0, 1]). Therefore, when we
maximize a linear functional
∫ v
u
ψ(t)K(t)dt over all nondecreasing functions
ψ : [u, v] → [α, β], it suffices to consider those functions that take only the
two extreme values α and β.
Proof. We have seen above that I ≥ I(a, b, c) for every a, b, c. We now show
that the supremum in I cannot be higher.
For each t, given ϕ(t) = ϕ1(t) + ϕ2(t), the expression ϕ1(t)K1(t) +
ϕ2(t)K2(t) is maximized by putting as much weight as possible—subject
to the constraints 0 ≤ ϕi(t) ≤ λi—on the higher of K1(t) and K2(t). This
gives the following upper bounds on ϕ1(t)K1(t) + ϕ2(t)K2(t):
• ϕ(t)max{K1(t), K2(t)} for every t in the interval where 0 ≤ ϕ(t) ≤ λ1;
• (ϕ(t)−λ1)K2(t)+λ1max{K1(t), K2(t)} for every t in the interval where
λ1 ≤ ϕ(t) ≤ λ2 (because ϕ1(t) ≤ λ1 implies ϕ2(t) ≥ ϕ(t)− λ1); and
• (ϕ(t)−λ2)K1(t)+(ϕ(t)−λ1)K2(t)+ (λ1+λ2−ϕ(t))max{K1(t), K2(t)}
for every t in the interval where λ2 ≤ ϕ(t) ≤ λ1 + λ2.
16Assume first that ψ(v) = 1. If ψ is a right-continuous function then ψ may be
viewed as a cumulative distribution function on [u, v], and we have ψ(t) =
∫
[u,t] dψ(x) =∫
[u,v]
1[x,v](t)dψ(x) for every t ∈ [u, v] (where 1E is the indicator function of the set
E, i.e., 1E(t) = 1 if t ∈ E and 1E(t) = 0 otherwise). If ψ is not necessarily right-
continuous, let ψ+(t) := limt′ցt ψ(t
′) (which is right-contiuous), ψ−(t) := limt′րt ψ(t
′),
and take λt ∈ [0, 1] such that ψ(t) = λtψ+(t) + (1 − λt)ψ−(t); then ψ =
∫
[u,v]
(λx1[x,v] +
(1− λx)1(x,v])dψ+(x).
If 0 < ψ(v) < 1 then ψ = ψ(v)ψ˜ + (1 − ψ(v))0, where ψ˜(t) := ψ(t)/ψ(v) and 0 is the
zero function (i.e., 0(t) = 0 for all t), and we apply the above to ψ˜. Finally, if ψ(v) = 0
then ψ = 0.
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In each one of these three intervals the bound is affine in ϕ and so, by the
remark above, when maximizing over nondecreasing ϕ, it suffices to consider
solely those functions ϕ that take only the corresponding two extreme values.
Altogether, such a ϕ takes only the values 0, λ1, λ2, and λ1 + λ2, say on
the intervals (0, a), (a, b), (b, c), and (c,∞), respectively—and then ∫ (ϕ1K1+
ϕ2K2) becomes precisely I(a, b, c). Thus indeed I ≤ sup I(a, b, c).
We now come to the main argument of our proof, which yields, using
Proposition 5, an upper bound on the Ki-term for our specific functions Ki.
Proposition 6 Let 0 < λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ 1, and let K1, K2 be given by (4) and
(5). Then
I ≤ 1
e
(λ2r1 + λ1r2 + λ1(e− 1)min{r1, r2}) .
Proof. Recalling (2), we have the following: for each i = 1, 2, the function
Hi(t) is continuous and strictly increasing at each t in the support of Xi
(because Gi(t) > 0 there), and Hi(∞) = E [Xi] ≥ ri (with strict inequality
unless Xi is constant, in which case everything trivializes). Therefore there
exists a finite τ i such that Hi(τ i) = ri; since for all t < ri we have Hi(t) ≤
t < ri (because Gi ≤ 1), it follows that
τ i ≥ ri.
Put Li(t) := Gj(t)(Hi(t)− ri); taking derivatives gives
L′i(t) = −fj(t)(Hi(t)− ri) +Gj(t)Gi(t) = −Ki(t).
We will use the following estimates:
∫ ∞
u
G1(t)G2(t)dt ≤
∫ ∞
u
r1
t
r2
t
dt =
r1r2
u
(15)
19
for every u > 0 (because Gi(t) ≤ ri/t);
Hi(u)− ri ≤ ri log u
ri
for every u ≥ ri (recall (3)); and, thus,
Li(u) = Gj(u)(Hi(u)− ri) ≤ rirj
u
log
u
ri
(16)
for every u ≥ ri. The last inequality implies that Li(u)→ 0 as u→∞, and
so ∫ ∞
u
Ki(t)dt = [−Li(t)]∞u = Li(u). (17)
Finally, letting {i, j} = {1, 2}, we have
Li(u) ≤ 1
e
rj and (18)
Li(u) +
rirj
u
≤ rj (19)
for every u ≥ ri (use (16) together with log x/x ≤ 1/e and (log x+ 1)/x ≤ 1
for all x > 0; note that there is no typo here: these bounds on Li use rj
rather than ri).
We need to bound I(a, b, c). For the last term of (14) we have, by (17)
and (18), ∫ ∞
b
K2(t)dt ≤ 1
e
r1, (20)
and so it remains to estimate J(a, c) :=
∫ c
a
max{K1, K2} +
∫∞
c
(K1 + K2).
A main difficulty in doing so is that the Ki are neither nonnegative nor
monotonic, and may change signs many times. To handle this we define for
each i an auxiliary function Mi(t) := fj(t)(Hi(t)− ri) = Ki(t) +G1(t)G2(t),
which vanishes at t = τ i, is nonpositive before τ i, and nonnegative after τ i;
i.e., Mi(t) ≥ 0 for t ≥ τ i and Mi(t) ≤ 0 for t ≤ τ i.
We distinguish three cases according to the location of a relative to τ 1 and
20
τ 2 (the points where M1 and M2 change sign); without loss of generality
17
assume that τ 1 ≤ τ 2.
• Case 1. a ≥ max{τ 1, τ 2} = τ 2. For every t ≥ a we have Mi(t) ≥ 0
(because t ≥ a ≥ τ i), and thus18
max{K1(t), K2(t)} = max{M1(t),M2(t)} −G1(t)G2(t)
≤ M1(t) +M2(t)−G1(t)G2(t)
= K1(t) +K2(t) +G1(t)G2(t).
Since we clearly also have K1 +K2 ≤ K1 +K2 +G1G2, we get
J(a, c) ≤
∫ ∞
a
(K1(t) +K2(t) +G1(t)G2(t))dt
≤ L1(a) + L2(a) + r1r2
a
=: J¯(a)
by (17) and (15). If, say, rk ≤ rℓ (where {k, ℓ} = {1, 2}) then using (18) for
i = k and (19) for i = ℓ (recall that a ≥ τ i ≥ ri for both i) yields19
J(a, c) ≤ J¯(a) ≤ 1
e
rℓ + rk.
• Case 2. τ 1 ≤ a < τ 2. In the range t ∈ [a, τ 2) ⊆ [τ 1, τ 2) we have
M1(t) ≥ 0 ≥ M2(t), and so K1(t) ≥ K2(t) and K2(t) ≤ 0; therefore both
max{K1(t), K2(t)} and K1(t) + K2(t) are ≤ K1(t), and thus, regardless of
17The expression J(a, b) that we estimate now is symmetric in i = 1, 2, and so the
assumption that λ1 ≤ λ2 is irrelevant here; we thus assume that τ1 ≤ τ2.
18This is the inequality max{x, y} ≤ x+ y + z whenever x, y ≥ −z.
19A slightly better estimate of (2/
√
e)
√
r1r2 may be obtained here by directly maximiz-
ing J¯(a) over a; however, this will not improve the overall estimate, due to Cases 2 and
3.
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where c is,
J(a, c) ≤
∫ τ2
a
K1(t)dt+ J¯(τ 2) = (L1(a)− L1(τ 2)) +
(
L1(τ 2) + L2(τ 2) +
r1r2
τ 2
)
= L1(a) +
r1r2
τ 2
≤ 1
e
r2 +min{r1, r2} ≤ 1
e
rℓ + rk,
where we have used: L2(τ 2) = 0 and τ 2 = max{τ 1, τ 2} ≥ max{r1, r2} (be-
cause τ i ≥ ri).
•Case 3. a < min{τ 1, τ 2} = τ 1. For every t ≤ τ 1 we haveK1(t) ≤M1(t) ≤ 0
and K2(t) ≤ M2(t) ≤ 0, and so both max{K1(t), K2(t)} and K1(t) +K2(t)
are ≤ 0 in the interval [a, τ 1]. Therefore J(a, c) ≤ J(τ 1,max{c, τ 1}), to which
we apply Case 2 (with a = τ 1).
Thus in all three cases the bound on J(a, c) is (1/e)rℓ + rk = (1/e)(r1 +
r2) + (1− 1/e)min{r1, r2}; together with (20), we get
I(a, b, c) ≤ λ1
e
r1 +
λ1
e
r2 +
λ1(e− 1)
e
min{r1, r2}+ λ2 − λ1
e
r1,
completing the proof.
Remark. If ϕ1 and ϕ2 are each required to be nondecreasing (rather than
just their sum), then we get a smaller bound on
∫
(ϕ1K1 + ϕ2K2), namely:
sup
ϕ
1
,ϕ
2
∫ ∞
0
(ϕ1(t)K1(t) + ϕ2(t)K2(t)) dt
= sup
0≤a≤∞
λ1
∫ ∞
a
K1(t)dt+ sup
0≤b≤∞
λ2
∫ ∞
b
K2(t)dt ≤ λ1
e
r2 +
λ2
e
r1
(use the remark preceding the proof of Proposition 5 together with (17) and
(18)). Therefore, for mechanisms µ = (q, s) where q1(t, t) and q2(t, t) are
monotonic—such as, for instance, symmetric mechanisms, where20 q1(t, t) =
20This proves Theorem B of Hart and Nisan (2017) for two independent and identically
distributed goods.
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q2(t, t)—we get, taking λ1 = λ2 = 1 in Proposition 4,
R(µ;X) ≤ r1 + r2 + 1
e
r1 +
1
e
r2 =
(
1 +
1
e
)
(r1 + r2).
This yields the bound e/(e+ 1), which is better than
√
e/(
√
e+ 1).
6 Completing the Proof
Combining the results of the previous two sections yields the first part of our
Main Result:
Theorem 7 Let X = (X1, X2) be a two-good random valuation with inde-
pendent goods. Then
SRev(X1, X2)
Rev(X1, X2)
≥
√
e√
e+ 1
≈ 0.62.
Proof. Let21 Ri :=Rev(Xi); thus SRev(X1, X2) = R1 + R2. Given 0 <
λ1 ≤ λ2, put X˜i := Xi/λi and ri :=Rev(X˜i) = Ri/λi. Using Lemma 2,
Proposition 4 for (X˜1, X˜2), and then Proposition 6, yields
Rev(X1, X2) ≤ λ1R1
λ1
+ λ2
R2
λ2
+
λ2
e
R1
λ1
+
λ1
e
R2
λ2
+
λ1(e− 1)
e
min
{
R1
λ1
,
R2
λ2
}
≤ R1 +R2 + 1
λe
R1 +
λ
e
R2 +
λ(e− 1)
e
R2 (21)
= R1 +R2 +
1
λe
R1 + λR2,
where in the second line we put λ := λ1/λ2 ∈ (0, 1] and used min {R1/λ1, R2/λ2} ≤
R2/λ2. The final expression equals (1+1/
√
e)(R1+R2) when λ = 1/
√
e, com-
pleting the proof.22
21The results of the previous sections will be applied to the rescaled X˜i = Xi/λi, and
so we will use ri for the revenue of X˜i, and Ri for the revenue of the original Xi.
22One may check that 1 + 1/
√
e is the best bound that is independent of R1 and R2
23
7 Regular Goods andMonotonic Mechanisms
In this section we prove the second part of our Main Result, namely, the
better bound of 73% for regular goods (and also for monotonic mechanisms).
We will use here only the symmetric diagonal decomposition (i.e., λ1 = λ2 =
1).
Following Myerson (1981), we say that a one-dimensional random variable
X is weakly regular if its support is an interval [α, β] with23 0 ≤ α < β ≤
∞, on which it has a density function f(t) that is positive and continuous,
and the resulting “virtual valuation function” t−G(t)/f(t) is nondecreasing
(Myerson’s regularity condition requires the virtual valuation to be strictly
increasing).
Lemma 8 Assume that X1 and X2 are weakly regular. Then Ki(u) > 0
implies that Ki(v) ≥ 0 for all v > u, for i = 1, 2.
Proof. Let [αi, βi] be the support of Xi. Assume by way of contradiction
that, say, K1(u) > 0 and K1(v) < 0 for some v > u. First, K1(u) > 0 implies
that f2(u) > 0 and H1(u) − r1 > 0 (otherwise K1(u) ≤ −G1(u)G2(u) ≤ 0),
and so α2 ≤ u ≤ β2 and u > α1 (because H1 is nondecreasing and H1(α1) ≤
α1 = α1 · G1(α1) ≤ r1). Second, K1(v) < 0 implies that G1(v) > 0 and
G2(v) > 0 (otherwise K1(v) = f2(v)(H1(v) − r1) ≥ f2(v)(H1(u) − r1) ≥ 0
since H1 is nondecreasing), and so v < β1 and v < β2 (because Gi(βi) = 0).
Together with u < v it follows that u and v both lie in the interval24 where
f2(t) > 0, G1(t) > 0, and H1(t)− r1 > 0. But in that interval the function κ,
defined by
κ(t) :=
K1(t)
f2(t)G1(t)
=
(
H1(t)− r1
G1(t)
− t
)
+
(
t− G2(t)
f2(t)
)
,
(when R1 = R2 the above expression is minimized only at λ = 1/
√
e).
23Notice that we allow β =∞, in which case the interval is understood to be [α,∞).
24I.e., t1 < u < v < β1, where t1 > α1 is the point where H1(t1) = r1, and α2 ≤ u <
v < β2.
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is increasing—the derivative of the first term is f1(t)(H1(t)− r1)/G21(t) > 0,
and the second term is nondecreasing by regularity. Therefore we cannot have
κ(u) > 0 and κ(v) < 0, which contradicts the assumption that K1(u) > 0
and K1(v) < 0.
This yields the second part of our Main Result:
Theorem 9 Let X = (X1, X2) be a two-good random valuation with inde-
pendent and weakly regular goods. Then
SRev(X1, X2)
Rev(X1, X2)
≥ e
e + 1
≈ 0.73.
Proof. Take λ1 = λ2 = 1 and let ri =Rev(Xi). Lemma 8 implies that if
Ki(t) is positive anywhere then it is nonnegative from that point on, and
so either (i) there is some finite u ≥ 0 such that Ki(t) ≤ 0 for t < u and
Ki(t) ≥ 0 for t ≥ u or (ii) Ki(t) ≤ 0 for all t ≥ 0. Therefore, for any function
ϕi with values in [0, 1], we have
∫ ∞
0
ϕi(t)Ki(t)dt ≤
∫ ∞
u
Ki(t)dt = Li(u) ≤ 1
e
rj
in case (i) (by (17) and (18)), and
∫∞
0
ϕi(t)Ki(t)dt ≤ 0 in case (ii). Altogether∫
ϕ1K1+
∫
ϕ2K2 ≤ (1/e)r2+(1/e)r1, and so Proposition 4 gives Rev(X) ≤
(1 + 1/e)(r1 + r2), proving the result.
Next, let MonRev(X) denote the maximal revenue that can be obtained
using monotonic mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms µ = (q, s) for which the func-
tion s(x) is nondecreasing in x.
Proposition 10 Let X = (X1, X2) be a two-good random valuation with
independent and weakly regular goods. Then
SRev(X1, X2)
MonRev(X1, X2)
≥ e
e + 1
≈ 0.73.
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Proof. Put ri :=Rev(Xi), and let Vi be the “equal-revenue” (ER) random
valuation with the same revenue ri as Xi; i.e., its tail distribution function
is Gˆi(t) = min{ri/t, 1} ≥ Gi(t). Take V1 and V2 to be independent, and
put V = (V1, V2). Because Vi first-order stochastically dominates Xi, for
every monotonic mechanism µ = (q, s) we have R(µ;X) = E [s(X1, X2)] ≤
E [s(V1, V2)] = R(µ;V ). Therefore
MonRev(X) ≤MonRev(V ) ≤ Rev(V ).
The ER-good Vi is weakly regular (because on its support [ri,∞) the vir-
tual valuation function t − Gˆi(t)/fˆi(t) is identically 0), and so SRev(V ) ≥
e/(e + 1)Rev(V ) by Theorem 9; together with SRev(X) = SRev(V ) (by
construction) and MonRev(X) ≤ Rev(V ) (see above), the result follows.
A Appendix: Revenue Continuity
This appendix deals with the continuity of the revenue with respect to valua-
tions, which is of independent interest. Take a sequence of k-good valuations
Xn that converges in distribution to the k-good random valuation X ; does
the sequence of revenues Rev(Xn) converge to25 Rev(X)?
Even in the one-good case this need not be so: for each n let Xn be the
one-good valuation that takes value 0 with probability 1 − 1/n and value n
with probability 1/n. Then Xn converges in distribution to the valuation X
that takes value 0 with probabilty 1. But Rev(Xn) = 1 (with the posted
25Only the distribution of a random valuation X matters for the revenue achievable
from X ; it is thus natural to consider what happens when Xn converges in distribution
to X . Formally, convergence in distribution is equivalent to the cumulative distribution
functions converging pointwise at all points of continuity of the limit cumulative distribu-
tion. Informally, being close in distribution means that the probabilities of nearby values
are close (see, for instance, (22) below). Billingsley’s (1968) book is a good reference for
the concepts used here.
26
price of n) while Rev(X) = 0.
We will show that if the valuations all lie in a bounded set—more gener-
ally, if the random valuations are uniformly integrable—then the limit of the
revenues equals the revenue of the limit. We emphasize that all the results
in this appendix are for general k-good valuations for any k ≥ 1, whether
the goods are independent or not.26
Some notation. First, it will be convenient to work here with the ℓ1-norm
on27 Rk, i.e., ||x||1 =
∑k
i=1 |xi|. The ℓ1-norm of a valuation x in Rk+ provides
a simple bound on the seller’s payoff in any mechanism µ = (q, s) that is
IR: s(x) ≤ q(x) · x ≤ ∑i xi = ||x||1; thus, if a random valuation X satisfies
||X||1 ≤ M then Rev(X) ≤ M. Second, the Prohorov distance between the
distributions of X and Y, which we denote by Dist(X, Y ), is defined as the
infimum of all ρ > 0 such that
P [X ∈ A] ≤ P [Y ∈ Bρ(A)] + ρ, and (22)
P [Y ∈ A] ≤ P [X ∈ Bρ(A)] + ρ
for all measurable sets A, where Bρ(A) := {y : ||y−x||1 < ρ for some x ∈ A}
is the ρ-neighborhood of A. Thus 0 ≤ Dist(X, Y ) ≤ 1, and Xn converges in
distribution to X, which we write as Xn
D→ X, if and only if Dist(X,Xn)→ 0
(again, see Billingsley 1968).
The basic result is that in the bounded case the distance between the
revenues of two random valuations is uniformly bounded by a function of the
Prohorov distance between their distributions.
Proposition 11 Let X and Y be k-good valuations with bounded values, say,
26Monteiro (2015) establishes continuity of the optimal revenue in the one-good case
with n independent buyers, when the valuations are bounded and the limit distributions
are continuous (his proof uses the characterization of the optimal mechanism).
27This affects only the various constants below.
27
||X||1, ||Y ||1 ≤ M for some M ≥ 1. Then28
|Rev(X)−Rev(Y )| ≤ (2M + 1)
√
Dist(X, Y ).
Proof. If Dist(X, Y ) = 1 there is nothing to prove, since both revenues are
between 0 and M.
Let thus 0 < ρ < 1 be such that (22) holds for every measurable set
A ⊆ Rk+, and take α so that ρ ≤ α < 1 (the value of α will be determined
later). Denote by DM := {x ∈ Rk+ : ||x||1 ≤ M} the domain of values of X
and Y.
Let µ = (q, s) be an IC, IR, and NPT mechanism, and let b be its buyer
payoff function. We define a new mechanism µ˜ by lowering all payments by a
factor of 1−α (and letting the buyer reoptimize). Thus, let cl W ⊂ Rk+1+ be
the closure of the set W := {(q(x), (1−α)s(x)) : x ∈ DM}. For each x ∈ DM
let (q˜(x), s˜(x)) be a maximizer for29 b˜(x) := max(g,t)∈cl W (g · x − t). Then
the mechanism µ˜ = (q˜, s˜) is IC (by the maximizer definition), IR (because
b˜(x) ≥ b(x) + αs(x), which is nonegative since µ is IR and NPT), and NPT
(because µ is NPT).30
Let x, y ∈ DM be such that ||x−y||1 ≤ ρ. Then (q˜(y), s˜(y)) ∈ clW can be
approximated by elements ofW : for every ε > 0 there is z ∈ DM such that, in
particular, |s˜(y)−(1−α)s(z)| ≤ ε and |[q˜(y)·y−s˜(y)]−[q(z)·y−(1−α)s(z)]| ≤
28We have not attempted to optimize the bound here.
29This maximum is attained because W is bounded, namely, W ⊆ [0, 1]k × [0,M ], and
so cl W is a compact set.
30Hart and Reny (2015) use this device of applying a small uniform discount to the
buyer’s payments to show that, at an arbitrarily small cost, the seller can perturb any
IC and IR mechanism so that the buyer breaks any indifference in the seller’s favor (the
resulting mechanism is thus called seller-favorable).
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ε. We then have
q(z) · y − (1− ε)s(z) + ε ≥ q˜(y) · y − s˜(y)
≥ q(x) · y − (1− α)s(x)
= q(x) · x− s(x) + q(x) · (y − x) + αs(x)
≥ q(z) · x− s(z) + q(x) · (y − x) + αs(x),
where the second inequality follows because (q(x), (1−α)s(x)) ∈ W, and the
last inequality follows because (q, s) is IC. Rearranging gives
α(s(z)− s(x)) ≥ (q(x)− q(z)) · (y − x)− ε.
Now |(q(x)−q(z))·(y−x)| ≤ ρ (because q(x), q(z) ∈ [0, 1]k and ||y−x||1 ≤ ρ),
and so
(1− α)s(z) ≥ (1− α)s(x)− 1− α
α
(ρ+ ε).
Recalling that s˜(y) ≥ (1− α)s(z)− ε yields
s˜(y) ≥ (1− α)s(x)− 1− α
α
(ρ+ ε)− ε;
as ε > 0 was arbitrary, we have
s˜(y) ≥ (1− α)s(x)− 1− α
α
ρ,
and so, using s(x) ≤ ||x||1 ≤M,
s˜(y) ≥ s(x)− β, (23)
where β := αM + (1− α)ρ/α.
For each t > 0 put A(t) := {x ∈ DM : s(x) ≥ t} and A˜(t) := {x ∈ DM :
s˜(x) ≥ t}. Inequality (23), which applies whenever ||y − x||1 ≤ ρ, implies
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that A˜(t− β) ⊇ Bρ(A(t)), and so
Rev(Y ) ≥ E [s˜(Y )] =
∫ ∞
0
P
[
Y ∈ A˜(t)
]
dt ≥
∫ M
β
P
[
Y ∈ A˜(t− β)
]
dt
≥
∫ M
β
P [Y ∈ Bρ(A(t))] dt ≥
∫ M
β
P [X ∈ A(t)] dt− (M − β)ρ
≥
∫ M
0
P [X ∈ A(t)] dt− β − (M − β)ρ = E [s(X)]− β′,
where β ′ := β + (M − β)ρ (for the fourth inequality we have used (22) and
β ≤M, which follows from ρ ≤ α and M ≥ 1).
Taking α =
√
ρ gives β ≤ (M + 1)√ρ and β ′ ≤ β +Mρ ≤ (2M + 1)√ρ.
The displayed inequality above holds for every µ and every ρ > Dist(X, Y ),
and so Rev(Y ) ≥ Rev(X) − (2M + 1)√Dist(X, Y ). Interchanging X and
Y completes the proof.
A sequence of random variables (Xn)n≥1 is uniformly integrable if for
every ε > 0 there is a finite M such that E
[||Xn||1 1||Xn||1>M] ≤ ε for all n.
Theorem 12 Let Xn be a sequence of k-good random valuations that con-
verges in distribution to the k-good random valuation X. Then
lim inf
n→∞
Rev(Xn) ≥ Rev(X).
Moreover, if the sequence Xn is uniformly integrable, then
lim
n→∞
Rev(Xn) = Rev(X) <∞.
Proof. For every M > 0 and every k-good valuation X, denote X(M) :=
X1||X||1≤M . Any IR, IC, and NPT mechanism µ = (q, s) satisfies s ≥ 0 and
s(0) = 0, and so E
[
s(X(M))
]
= E
[
s(X)1||X||1≤M
]
monotonically increases
to E [s(X)] as M increases to infinity. Therefore Rev(X(M)) monotonically
increases to Rev(X).
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If Xn
D→ X then Xn(M)
D→ X(M) for almost every M > 0—specifically, for
those M where31 P [||X||1 = M ] = 0—and so limnRev(Xn(M)) = Rev(X(M))
by Proposition 11. Now Rev(Xn) ≥ Rev(Xn(M)), and hence
lim infnRev(X
n) ≥ Rev(X(M)) for almost every M. Letting M →∞ proves
the first part of the theorem.
If in addition the sequence Xn is uniformly integrable, then for every
ε > 0 there is M > 0 with P [||X||1 =M ] = 0 that is large enough so that
E
[||Xn||1 1||Xn||1>M] ≤ ε for all n. Since, as seen above, 0 ≤ s(x) ≤ ||x||1 for
every IR and NPTmechanism µ = (q, s), it follows that E
[
s(Xn)1||Xn||1>M
] ≤
ε for all n, and thus Rev(Xn(M)) ≥ Rev(Xn) − ε for all n (this also shows
that the revenues are all finite, as they are bounded by M + ε). Therefore
Rev(X) ≥ Rev(X(M)) = limnRev(Xn(M)) ≥ lim supnRev(Xn) − ε, which,
together with the first part of the theorem, proves the second part.
A.1 Continuous Valuations
It is often convenient—as in the present paper—to restrict attention to ran-
dom valuations whose distributions admit a density function (i.e., their cumu-
lative distribution functions are absolutely continuous; we refer to these for
now as “continuous”). We now show that for the results in the present paper
one may restrict attention to continuous random valuations. Indeed, assume
that we have already proved a result of the form Rev(X) ≤ θ SRev(X) for
all such continuous X, and let X be a valuation that is not necessarily contin-
uous (and so it may have atoms and even finite support). First, because, as
we have seen in the proof of Theorem 12 above, Rev(X(M))→M→∞Rev(X)
and SRev(X(M)) →M→∞SRev(X), it suffices to prove the result for ran-
dom valuations X with bounded values, say ||X||1 ≤ M. Second, let U be
independent of X and distributed uniformly on [0, 1]k, and for every n define
Xn := X+(1/n)U.Then, clearly, the valuationsXn are continuous, Xn
D→ X,
31These are the points of continuity of the cumulative distribution function of ||X ||1;
see Corollary 1 to Theorem 5.1 in Billingsley (1968).
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and the sequence Xn is bounded (||Xn||1 ≤ ||X||1+(1/n)k ≤M +k); there-
fore Rev(Xn) →n→∞Rev(X) and SRev(Xn) →n→∞SRev(X) (apply the
second part of Theorem 12 to the sequences Xn
D→ X and Xni D→ Xi for all
goods i). Thus Rev(X) ≤ θ SRev(X) holds for every bounded X, and so
for every X.
B Appendix: Nonsymmetric Diagonals
In this appendix we illustrate how the use of nonsymmetric diagonals alone
may strictly improve the 50% bound of Hart and Nisan (2017), and, in some
cases, also the 62% bound of our Theorem 7.32 However, this improvement
is not uniform, in the sense that it does not yield a better constant than33
50%.
Proposition 13 Let X = (X1, X2) be a two-good random valuation with
independent goods. Then
Rev(X1, X2) ≤
(√
Rev(X1) +
√
Rev(X2)
)2
.
Remark. When Rev(X1) 6= Rev(X2) the right-hand side is strictly less
than 2(Rev(X1)+ Rev(X2)), the bound of Theorem A of Hart and Nisan
(2017) (when Rev(X1) = Rev(X2) the two bounds are the same).
Proof. We follow the proof of Theorem A in Hart and Nisan (2017), but
we now split the computation along the diagonal Y = λZ for some λ > 0
32To get more than 50% the single-good revenues need just to be different, and to get
more than 62% they need to be significantly so (with the revenue of one good about 9
times higher than the revenue of the other).
33Yet another non-uniform bound may be obtained by optimizing λ in the first line of
(21):
Rev(X1, X2) ≤ R1 +R2 +min
{
2√
e
√
R1R2,
2
e
√
R1R2 +
(
1− 1
e
)
min{R1, R2}
}
,
where Ri =Rev(Xi) for i = 1, 2.
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(instead of splitting along Y = Z). The arguments in the proof there carry
over, and, for each fixed value z of Z, we now have
E [s(Y, Z)1Y≥λZ |Z = z] ≤ Rev(Y ) + zP [Y ≥ λz]
= Rev(Y ) +
1
λ
(λz)P [Y ≥ λz]
≤ Rev(Y ) + 1
λ
Rev(Y ) =
(
1 +
1
λ
)
Rev(Y ).
Similarly, for each fixed value y of Y ,
E
[
s(Y, Z)1Z≥(1/λ)Y |Y = y
] ≤ Rev(Z) + yP [Z ≥ y
λ
]
= Rev(Z) + λ
y
λ
P
[
Z ≥ y
λ
]
≤ Rev(Z) + λRev(Z) = (1 + λ)Rev(Z).
Taking expectation over the values of Z and Y, adding the two inequali-
ties, and then minimizing the resulting expression over λ (by taking λ =√
Rev(Y )/Rev(Z) ) yields the result.
Remark. A better bound than the one of Proposition 13, albeit also non-
uniform, has been obtained by Kupfer (2017).
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